Basic research, as defined by export control regulations, encompasses

• “experimental or theoretical work primarily aimed at gaining new insights into the fundamental principles of phenomena or facts, which is not primarily directed toward a specific practical goal or purpose.”
• Experimental and theoretical work that (according to the BAFA handbook “Export Control and Academia”) corresponds to a Technology Readiness Level of up to TRL3.
• Research without funding from industry.      

A catch-all clause is an export control regulation requiring authorization for non-listed, non-controlled items when the exporter knows or is informed by authorities that the items are intended for critical end-uses, such as weapon proliferation or military use in embargoed countries. It acts as a safety net, allowing authorities to manage risks from technologies not explicitly on control lists.

For export projects involving goods subject to authorization, it is therefore necessary to appoint an Chief Export Control Officer (CECO or "Ausfuhrverantwortliche*r (AV)) to the BAFA. The CECO is personally responsible for compliance with export control regulations and must be a member of the board of directors or management. The appointment of the AV is valid until revoked.

The civil clause is a voluntary commitment by academic institutions, such as universities, to conduct research exclusively for civilian purposes. The freedom of teaching and research, which is enshrined in the Basic Law, is firmly established. Therefore, the civil clause can only be a voluntary form of restriction. The University of Greifswald currently has no civil clause. From a legal perspective, the practical effect of civil clauses is limited in light of the freedom of science guaranteed by the German Constitution (Grundgesetz); that is, a civil clause does not exempt an institution from establishing and complying with export control regulations.

US export law applies if 1.) my European product has more than 25% listed US components or was manufactured using US technology (know-how). 2.) my European product has more than 10% listed US components or was manufactured using US technology, if it is exported to Cuba, Syria, Iran, or North Korea 3.) the product was manufactured, assembled, or modified in the US 

A special feature of, e.g., US export control: The transfer of controlled technology or technical knowledge to a foreign person within the US or a third country (in the case of cooperation, e.g., Germany) is treated legally as if this information had been exported to that person's home country. In the US, not only physical exports of goods are subject to licensing requirements, but also: technical data, construction plans, software source code, research data, verbal statements, access to servers, laboratory access to controlled technology
If a “foreign person” (i.e., not a U.S. citizen or green card holder) gains access to such controlled items (even in the cooperating third country), this is considered:
“Export to that person’s home country”
→ even if the information never physically leaves the U.S. or the cooperating third country.

An example of a deemed export, i.e., an export requiring a license, would be technical support provided to foreigners in Germany. 

Dual-use items are all listed and unlisted items (including goods, software and technology) that have dual or multiple uses (both civilian and military, as well as repressive or unethical uses)—that is, items with the potential for misuse

Due diligence in science refers to the thorough analysis and evaluation of a planned collaboration with individuals or institutions. This process involves a careful examination of aspects such as objectives, strategies, ethical considerations, and potential risks.
The aim of due diligence in science is to get to know the cooperation partner as well as possible in order to enable trusting, secure, and profitable cooperation, weigh up opportunities and risks, and identify and avert potential dangers at an early stage.                                                                                                                                                                              

Due diligence follows five basic principles:                                                                                                                                                                                            

1. Science itself must shape the protection of science and cooperation.
2. Openness to cooperation as an integral part of science must be protected.
3. Research security concepts must be designed in such a way that they do not hinder cooperation.
4. The benefits of due diligence in science measures must be proportionate to the efforts involved.
5. The measures must be comprehensible and meaningful to researchers.

The Export Administration Regulations (EAR) are the implementing regulations of the U.S. Export Administration Act (EAA). These export control regulations are issued by the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) and govern the export and reexport of U.S. goods.
The EAR governs the export and reexport of both so-called dual-use items and purely commercial goods with no military application. In addition, the export and reexport of other items are controlled by other regulations and other U.S. agencies.
Essentially, the US government pursues four objectives with the EAR:

• Protection of the national security of the United States
• Support for US foreign policy
• Prevention of the proliferation or transfer of weapons of mass destruction (non-proliferation)
• Safeguarding short-term US interests

Export control is a clearly defined, legally binding field: it determines whether certain goods, software, or technological know-how (dual-use items, military equipment) may be transferred abroad only with authorization or not at all.

Export control encompasses all legal regulations, such as the EU Dual-Use Regulations, the Foreign Trade Act (AWG), Foreign Trade Regulation (AWV), or embargo regulations, which are intended to prevent certain goods, technologies, or knowledge from being used for military or security-threatening purposes. In certain cases, authorization from the Federal Office for Economic Affairs and Export Control (BAFA) is required prior to any transfer or cooperation. Violations of export control regulations, such as the export of listed goods without authorization or violations of EU embargo or sanctions regulations, are punishable by law and can result in substantial fines or imprisonment for up to 5 years.

Listed items include military equipment and, in particular, so-called dual-use items—that is, products, software, or technologies with civilian applications that can also be used for military purposes. 

While export control is primarily relevant in the field of life sciences and engineering sciences, interdisciplinary research, digital methods, and the increasing use of artificial intelligence mean that projects in other research disciplines may also be subject to export control regulations.

The goal of export control is not to restrict research, but to ensure the responsible handling of sensitive technologies and knowledge.

An export control officer (ECO or EKB for "Exportkontrollbeauftragte*r) is the central point of contact at the university for export control and sanctions law; responsible for raising awareness, providing advice, reviewing and monitoring compliance with export control regulations in research, teaching and international cooperation by establishing an internal compliance programme (ICP). 

The concept of significance in the context of export controls and the transfer of knowledge refers to the question of how important or relevant certain information or technologies are in the context of export control regulations. This concerns the scope and significance of the information or technology being transferred. If someone shares specific, sensitive knowledge in an area subject to export controls, this could be considered a violation of export regulations, depending on the “significance” of the knowledge.

The following, among others, are generally NOT covered due to their low significance:

• Brochures, catalogs, publicly available information
• Photos without technical details
• Schematic drawings without dimensions
• Performance data, connection and consumption data
• Project and management plans
• Standards and specifications
• Technical articles and generally available publications
• General process and procedure descriptions
• Operating instructions (if publicly available)

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The concept of indispensability in the context of export controls and the transfer of knowledge refers to whether the technology or knowledge is essential—that is, indispensable—for the recipient to achieve specific objectives or produce specific products. This means that if the objectives or products can be achieved through established alternative means (which may be more time-consuming or costly), then the technology or knowledge is not indispensable, and its transfer could therefore be exempt from licensing requirements.

The transferred knowledge or technology is to be considered non-indispensable (i.e., dispensable) within the meaning of the Dual-Use Regulation if:

• the transferred knowledge does not contain product-specific know-how (e.g., through many detailed parameters),
• alternative manufacturing processes exist,
• the technology “only” makes the production of the already listed item more efficient compared to existing processes,
• the listed performance characteristics can be achieved even without this knowledge/technology.

Key question: Would competent experts still be able to develop or manufacture the listed item (e.g., using alternative established methods) even without the transferred technology (specific knowledge/know-how)? (Financial or time costs are irrelevant in this context.) If so, then the knowledge or technology is not indispensable, and its transfer could be exempt from licensing requirements.

The decisive factor is the person's usual place of residence. In the case of technical support, according to the Foreign Trade and Payments Act (§51 (5)), persons with permanent residence or habitual abode in Germany for more than 5 years are considered nationals, regardless of their nationality. According to the Foreign Trade Act, only technical support for persons who are permanently resident outside Germany or who are only staying in Germany for a limited period (< 5 years) is subject to approval.

Goods are movable objects that can be the subject of commercial transactions and electricity. Securities and means of payment are not goods (section 2 para. 22 AWG).

In its fact sheet titled “Internal Export Controls,” the Federal Office for Economic Affairs and Export Control (BAFA) explicitly points out the obligation to implement an internal compliance program (ICP) for companies engaged in foreign trade whose product range includes listed items or items that can be used for critical purposes, citing Section 8(2) of the Foreign Trade Act (AWG).                                                                                                                                                    

An ICP should include the following aspects:

• Top-level management commitment to export control compliance
• Risk analysis
• Organisational structure/chain of responsibilities
• Human, technical and other resources
• Process organisation
• Record keeping and documentation
• Selection of staff, staff training and awareness-raising
• Person-related controls/system-related controls (ICP audit)/corrective measures/whistle-blower system
• Physical and technical security

For the purposes of export control at universities, “items” refers to all tangible goods and intangible items whose transfer or use may be subject to export control restrictions, in particular:

• Tangible goods or merchandise: e.g., devices, machinery, laboratory equipment, prototypes, samples
• Software: programs, source codes, algorithms
• Technology and know-how: technical knowledge, blueprints, design documents, research data, methods, protocols
• Technical support in the form of:
  • digital content: data transmission via email, cloud, remote access
  • Scientific services: e.g., repairs, consulting or training with content relevant to export controls

This also covers intangible technology transfer, such as through teaching, training, publications, lectures, or collaboration with foreign researchers.

In the current debate on international cooperation and technology transfer, the terms “knowledge security” and “research security” are often used interchangeably. In the context of its position paper, the German Science Council uses the term “knowledge security,” as this term encompasses not only research activities but all scientific activities, including the exchange of staff and students. Knowledge security as a value aims both to safeguard specific national interests and values and to continue protecting the core of scientific work, namely the ability to work under conditions of guaranteed academic freedom and to cooperate internationally.

Knowledge security encompasses several dimensions that relate to different risks:

1. Undesirable knowledge outflow
2. Undesirable influence
3. Financial and scientific dependencies
4. Interference of scientific activities with other areas of society
5. Violations of research ethics or ethical principles

Listed items include military equipment and dual-use items specified in national or European regulations at the time of export. Dual-use items are items that are primarily used for civilian purposes but can also be used for military purposes. The following areas are particularly affected:

  General electronics
  Propulsion systems, spacecraft, and related equipment
  Nuclear materials, facilities, and equipment
  Avionics and navigation
  Marine and naval technology
  Computers
  Sensors and lasers
  Telecommunications, information security
  Materials processing
  Materials, chemicals, microorganisms, and toxins

The export of listed goods (movable objects) abroad is always subject to authorization, regardless of the specific intended use in each individual case. 

In this context, the term “non-public data and technologies” refers to specific data or technologies that are not public not only because they have not been disclosed, but also because they are not freely accessible or usable due to security, export, or usage restrictions. This means that, for various reasons—such as legal, security-related, or economic considerations—this data or these technologies are subject to special controls or other restrictions (e.g., confidentiality clauses, third-party review of content or wording prior to publication).

The concept of research security extends beyond legally mandated export control: Research security addresses not only the export of prohibited items, but also all risks that research findings, data, or collaborations might be misused, spied upon, or exploited for political purposes—even in cases where no formal authorization is required. This includes cyber and information security, partner and funding checks, as well as integrity and ethics issues.

In the current debate on international collaborations and technology outflow, the terms “knowledge security” and “research security” are often used synonymously; however, the term “knowledge security” (see glossary) is intended to emphasize the responsibility of all actors involved in the scientific system and is not directed exclusively at researchers.

Research or items are considered security-relevant (the term “sensitive” is often used interchangeably) to the extent that they contribute or are intended to contribute to maintaining internal and external security, as well as to building resilience and preserving the natural resources of the community, OR to the extent that they could jeopardize these (e.g., research on systemically important and thus critical infrastructure such as water or electricity supply).

Technical support or Technical assistance in export control involves the transfer of intangible (disembodied) knowledge. It represents all technical support related to repairs, development, manufacture, assembly, testing, maintenance, or any other technical service, and may take forms such as instruction, advice, training, transmission of working knowledge or skills or consulting services, including by electronic means as well as by telephone or any other verbal forms of assistance (see Art. 2 No. 9 EU Dual-Use Regulation, cf. also Section 2 para. 16 AWG).

Foreign trade law establishes licensing requirements for the cross-border movement of items. “Items” generally refer to merchandise, software, and technology.

Technology refers to the specific knowledge required for the development, manufacture, or use of a product. This technical knowledge is embodied in the form of “technical documentation” or “technical assistance.” This follows from the identical definition in Annex I of the EU Dual-Use Regulation and in the Export List. Technical documentation (embodied technology) or data refers to information that is physical or tangible. For example, technical data may take the form of blueprints, plans, models, formulas, technical designs and specifications, manuals, and instructions that are written or recorded on other media or devices such as a hard drive, servers, mobile storage devices, or solid-state storage.

In the context of export control on research, the Technology Readiness Level (TRL) serves as a (rough) guide to determine whether research is still unrestricted or has already become subject to export control regulations. The Technology Readiness Level (TRL) is a nine-level rating system used to assess how developed and ready for use a technology is. Originally developed by NASA, the TRL is now used by the EU, industry, and the research community, among others. 

TRL 1 – Basic principles observed
Scientific fundamentals are being researched (pure research).

TRL 2 – Technology concept formulated
Initial ideas and potential applications are described.

TRL 3 – Experimental demonstration
Feasibility is demonstrated through laboratory experiments (“Proof of Concept”).

TRL 4 – Validation in the laboratory
Individual components or prototypes are tested in the laboratory.

TRL 5 – Validation in a relevant environment
The technology is tested under realistic conditions.

TRL 6 – Demonstration in a relevant environment
A functional prototype is tested in a practical environment.

TRL 7 – Demonstration in operational environment
System prototype is tested under real operational conditions.

TRL 8 – System complete and qualified
Technology is fully developed and tested (e.g., pre-production series).

TRL 9 – System in use
Technology is market-ready and is being successfully utilized.

Even if the research is basic research (TRL 1–3), it may still be security-relevant research and thus subject to export control regulations → The TRL can therefore only serve as an initial guide and does not relieve one of the duty of due diligence to assess the security relevance of the research.

This includes dual-use items that are subject to other legal provisions. Such provisions may arise from embargo regulations, the Anti-Torture Regulation, or the Firearms Regulation. It also includes items for which you, as the exporter, are aware of—or should be aware of—a security-related (i.e., sensitive) end-use. (see Catch-all clause)